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Introduction
The security impact of oil nationalization has garnered much attention 
among politicians, policy analysts, economists, energy companies, and 
other interested observers in recent years. Nationalization of oil is the 
process by which states de-privatize operations or exploit previously 
undeveloped resources via a state-controlled oil company. The national-
ization process often occurs in an ad hoc fashion, and the private compa-
nies that formerly owned the assets rarely receive fair market value for 
their assets or reserves. Oil export restrictions are often associated with 
nationalization. Given the finite nature of oil reserves, nationalization of 
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oil industry operations can be a potent geopolitical weapon enabling 
countries to use their oil exports as a tool to influence the behavior of 
dependent importer states.1 The use of the oil weapon is one of the pri-
mary ways that oil nationalization can negatively influence security. As 
this article will demonstrate, oil nationalization can be destabilizing at the 
local, regional, and global levels. To consider how nationalization might 
influence security in the future, it is useful to analyze the problem through 
an alternate futures methodology.
This article will highlight the security impact of oil nationalization, 
develop and analyze four energy security scenarios, and suggest options 
to reduce the potential negative impact of oil nationalization. In addition 
to the use of oil as a weapon, nationalization of oil can also lead to compe-
tition for scarce resources between states, facilitate the funding of terror-
ists or insurgents, contribute to destabilizing regional arms races, 
influence intra-state conflict, and sustain antagonistic political agendas.
The four energy security scenarios developed in this article answer the 
focal question: What impact might nationalization of oil reserves and 
industry assets have on global security in ten years? They cover the spec-
trum of potential futures from the most malign to the most benign. The 
scenarios are entitled Conflicted World, Muddling Along, Smooth Sail-
ing, and Crisis Management.
For the purposes of this article, security is defined as the condition of a 
state's being free from threat against its sovereign territory, its institu-
tions, its critical infrastructure, its economic interests, and the interests of 
its citizens. This broader understanding of security was chosen, rather 
than energy security alone, because nationalization of energy assets 
affects more than just energy security, as explained below. Energy secu-
rity can be defined broadly as the condition of having sufficient, afford-
able, reliable, and safe energy resources to conduct the economic, 
political, security, social, health, and welfare activities necessary for the 
functioning of a state.
This article will outline the scenario methodology used and then explain 
the focal issue. It will then analyze the contemporary and potential future 
influence of nationalization on security, as understanding the impact of 
oil nationalization is necessary to appreciate how it could influence the 
different scenarios. These sections will be followed by the determination 
of the two factors most relevant to the scenario development: the critical 
uncertainties. This will be followed by the development of the scenarios 
and an examination of their implications and indicators. The article will 
finish with a brief concluding section.
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Methodology
A quadrant projection model was used to devise the scenario set for this 
article.2 This method is less bounded by current thinking than linear pro-
jection techniques and thus can facilitate unbiased development of sce-
narios. The quadrant model used for this paper was developed as follows:
1.  Identify the focal issue.
2. Describe the contemporary experience to determine current factors.
3. Determine future factors.
4. Rank the factors to determine the two most critical uncertainties.
5. Define the scenarios and determine their stories.
6. Determine the implications.
7. Determine the indicators.
The Focal Issue
Determination of a focal issue is crucial for successful scenario develop-
ment. The issue helps to maintain the purpose of the process and deter-
mine the factors that form the critical uncertainties.3 As noted above, the 
focal issue for this set of four scenarios is: What impact might nationaliza-
tion of oil reserves and industry assets have on global security in ten 
years?
Contemporary Experience and Current Factors
The decision to nationalize oil assets has often been linked to price trends. 
In sustained periods of high prices, states tend to nationalize extractive 
industries more frequently. This is because profits are higher during these 
periods, so even though Nationalized Oil Companies (NOCs) tend to oper-
ate less effectively, they are still profitable. When prices drop for a sus-
tained period, governments that have nationalized resource industries 
sometimes permit International Oil Companies (IOCs) to return because 
they generally possess the technical expertise to exploit the reserves prof-
itably at lower prices.4 However, this is risky for the IOCs since the host 
country may unilaterally change the terms of the contract. This occurred 
recently in Russia where Shell, Total, BP, and other international compa-
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nies were stripped of their controlling shares of operations in a variety of 
fields including Shtokman, Sakhalin I, Sakhalin II, and Kovytka.5 Similar 
contractual duplicity has occurred in Venezuela where the government 
has altered contracts with IOCs to give state-owned Petróleos de Venezu-
ela SA (PDVSA) a controlling interest in several projects.6 
Nationalization of oil reserves and facilities can contribute to oil market 
and economic distortions, the politicization/militarization of oil security, 
and the use of oil revenue in destabilizing ways. However, when countries 
that nationalize their assets are genuine liberal democracies with trans-
parent revenue generation streams—including effective taxation 
regimes—and observant of international diplomatic and trade norms, 
then the impact of oil nationalization on energy security is neutral. Com-
panies in these countries operate similarly to free market oil companies. 
Norway, with its state-owned Statoil, is a case in point in that it operates 
virtually the same as publicly traded IOCs. Yet, most of the nationalized 
countries listed in Appendix A are non-democratic and have limited 
transparency. Many of these states lack effective taxation regimes so their 
leaders often treat oil revenues as a primary source of funding for their 
agendas. Moreover, as detailed below, some of these states have used oil 
exports as a political weapon in the past and are likely to continue to do 
so.
In order to appreciate the level of influence that NOCs exert on global oil 
security it is necessary to understand their market share. Appendix A lists 
most of the countries that have nationalized their domestic and overseas 
oil company operations and indicates that they possessed 92.5% of total 
global proved reserves and accounted for 81.5% of total global oil produc-
tion in 2008.7 This is not to suggest that all of the production or reserves 
listed in the appendix were the property of NOCs since, in many cases, 
IOCs also operate in the listed countries.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the production ratio between IOCs and 
NOCs has virtually reversed since the 1970s. In 1972, the last year before 
the first major OPEC-driven oil shock, IOCs produced approximately 93% 
of global crude oil, whereas NOCs produced roughly 7%. In 2007, by 
contrast, IOCs accounted for approximately 23% of daily production 
against roughly 77% for NOCs.8 This trend in favor of NOCs will likely 
continue since much of the IOC production has occurred in non-
nationalized regions, such as the United States, where fields are generally 
older and closer to depletion. Moreover, recent history has witnessed 
more nationalization, such as those undertaken by the Venezuelan or 
Ecuadorian Governments.
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Nationalization of oil has a negative impact on the market and on the 
profitability of IOCs by limiting their access to reserves.9 Most of the 
reserves controlled by NOCs are located in places where oil is more 
easily—and thus more cheaply—extracted, leaving more challenging and 
less profitable reserves for the IOCs. These companies generally run much 
more efficiently than NOCs and would possibly increase the global crude 
supply or develop spare production capacity if they could access reserves 
held by NOCs.10 Spare production capacity is vital to reduce the shock of 
supply disruptions.
Currently, the major oil development opportunities are in the Middle 
East, Russia, Venezuela, the Canadian oil sands, and offshore Brazil. Of 
these, only Canada is not a nationalized country and offers access to 
reserves in a low-risk political environment. The stable political situation 
in Canada has helped spur investment in oil sands development.11 There 
has been some speculation that the Arctic might also provide opportuni-
ties for IOCs in the near term. However, it seems likely that developments 
in this region will proceed slowly.12 Thus, IOCs are struggling to compete 
in a market saturated by NOCs.
The impact on the global oil supply of dwindling investment opportunities 
for IOCs is compounded by the trend toward mergers and acquisitions of 
publicly traded oil and gas companies in recent years. Consequently, the 
reserves held by IOCs have come under increasingly centralized control. 
In 1990, the five largest IOCs controlled 60% of total IOC reserves. By 
2005 they controlled 84%. These companies have been slow to invest in 
new production in light of generally high oil prices. Consequently, it may 
be the case that IOC production will decline somewhat in the near- to 
mid-term due to decreased competition, possibly leading to a situation 
where NOCs produce an even larger proportion of the global supply.13 
Oil market distortions can result from deficiencies in operations by 
nationalized companies. This is because the diversion of revenue from the 
oil and gas companies to government coffers reduces infrastructure 
reinvestment, leading to production declines that reduce global supply.14 
For example, Mexico's crude output has steadily declined from its peak of 
3.824 million barrels per day in 2004 to 3.157 million barrels per day in 
2008.15 Some analysts predict that Mexico will become a net importer of 
oil within a decade. The Mexican Government taxes Pemex, the national 
oil company, at slightly more than 60% of its gross revenue. 
Consequently, in the absence of foreign investment, currently forbidden 
by the Mexican constitution, Pemex must rely on government borrowing 
to develop infrastructure and maintain operations. This has led to a 
deterioration of infrastructure that has significantly reduced productivity. 
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Granted, Mexican reserves are believed to be declining as well, although a 
major reason for the output decline is inadequate investment in 
infrastructure.16 
The economies of nationalized states often lack diversification and conse-
quently are extremely sensitive to swings in oil prices. These states often 
succumb to the so-called "resource curse," characterized by susceptibility 
to boom and bust cycles; inflation of the value of the state currency, which 
increases the challenge of developing non-resource related industries 
because imports become comparatively cheaper;17 and the generation of 
resource revenue streams that can feed a culture of greed and corruption 
facilitated by the lack of transparency. Under these conditions, many citi-
zens lack economic opportunities and become dissatisfied with their gov-
ernment, potentially to the extent that political unrest, sometimes violent, 
results.18 The seemingly intractable violence in the Niger Delta serves as a 
stark example of the resource curse.19 
Some scholars also suggest that the process of democratization can be 
prevented or distorted in nationalized oil states. They attribute this to the 
cycle of greed and corruption that characterize some states whose extrac-
tive industry developed prior to their contemporary political institutions. 
When political development occurs in this order, the rulers often rely on 
resource revenue to fund government programs and operations instead of 
developing a functional taxation system. In the absence of this system, the 
normal social contract between a government and the governed does not 
develop nor does a functional bureaucracy. Factions within the society 
who might oppose the government are placated through lavish expendi-
tures, paid for through resource rent, or subjugated by the state security 
apparatus. These two transactions, in turn, necessitate more expenditure 
of the resource wealth. The bureaucracy becomes a key interface in this 
climate of greed and corruption. Once entrenched, this political culture is 
difficult to uproot so the prospects for positive change are meager.20 
Oil as a Weapon
Another significant impact of nationalized oil operations is the use of the 
"oil weapon" by exporting states in order to influence the behavior of, or 
possibly inflict economic damage on, consumer countries. There are con-
temporary examples of this, such as Russia's cessation of oil exports to the 
Czech Republic on the day that Prague agreed to accept a U.S. radar 
installation on Czech territory as part of the European Ballistic Missile 
Defense.21 Consumer states often lack the ability to quickly change 
sources of oil supply due to the nature of contracts, the difficulty in shift-
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ing refinery processes to handle different grades of crude and, in periods 
of short supply, the dearth of spare global capacity to replace interrupted 
petroleum shipments. Yet, exporting states can also suffer from their own 
use of the oil weapon since they often depend on the revenue they obtain 
from their exports. If they cannot find new buyers, they must have other 
sources of revenue or can only afford to disrupt their exports for short 
periods of time.
There has been considerable debate in recent years regarding the longev-
ity of the oil supply, with some analysts suggesting that global peak oil 
production has already been reached and others suggesting that it will 
occur at some point during this century.22 The issue of peak oil is outside 
of the scope of this article, although it is important to understand that the 
availability of adequate quantities of oil on the market reduces the impact 
of supply disruptions. A well-supplied market can lessen the degree and 
longevity of disruptions better than an inadequately supplied one. It 
seems logical then that states that have nationalized their oil resources 
might be reticent to interrupt exports for political reasons if the market is 
well-supplied. This is because, under this circumstance, countries whose 
supplies are cut will be more able to find alternative sources. However, 
this is not guaranteed since converting refineries to handle different crude 
can take some time; therefore, the impact of supply disruptions will still 
be felt to a limited degree, even when markets are well-supplied.
Consumer states do have some options to reduce the impact of the use of 
the oil weapon. The development of strategic petroleum reserves provides 
some protection against short periods of supply disruption. Indeed, the 
impetus for creating the International Energy Agency (lEA), with its stra-
tegic reserves prerequisite for members who are net-importers, was the 
1973 OPEC oil embargo. Another option is to diversify oil suppliers in 
order to reduce dependencies on particular sources. Switching to alterna-
tive sources of energy or reducing consumption through changing habits 
are also options. Development of new technology and techniques to 
increase the output of existing oil fields or to extract crude from more 
challenging reserves can also help to overcome the potential negative 
energy security impacts of the oil weapon. However, since oil is a finite 
resource, it will eventually become scarce. Consequently, it is possible 
that competition among states for access to oil will increase and could 
become violent during the coming decade.
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Oil Arms, Insurgents, and Terrorists
Oil nationalization can have a more direct impact on security when reve-
nues are used in destabilizing ways. In some cases, oil revenues sustain 
extensive armaments programs that can lead to regional arms races. For 
example, it has been reported in recent years that Venezuelan expendi-
tures on arms have been far in excess of any amount necessary to safe-
guard the country. President Chavez spent approximately $4 billion on 
arms purchases during 2005 and 2006, leading all other Latin American 
countries during this period. A portion of this spending went toward the 
purchase of 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles along with the rights to 
manufacture more of these weapons and their ammunition in Venezuela. 
Critics point out that Chavez did not consult the National Assembly and 
has been arming not only the Venezuelan military but also his partisan 
civilian reserve, suggesting that these measures might protect him should 
he lose the support of the military.23 Some other countries in Latin Amer-
ica are alarmed by Venezuela's program and consider it to be destabilizing 
for the region. Brazil, for example, increased its defense spending from 
$1.1 billion in 2007 to $2.5 billion in 2008, in part because of its concerns 
over Venezuela's military purchases.24 Given that PDVSA provides a very 
large share of government revenue, 37.8% in 2007,25 these acquisitions 
could not be sustained without the oil industry.
Venezuela's neighbors have reason to be concerned about its behavior in 
light of the 2008 revelation that President Chavez was linked, by captured 
computer files on a rebel leader's laptop, to a program providing arms, 
training, and advice to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 
(FARC) and its effort to overthrow Columbia's Government.26 Other 
reports suggest that Chavez permits FARC, and Columbia's other leftist 
guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), to operate within 
Venezuela. This has created several problems for Venezuelans since FARC 
and the ELN partially fund their operations through destabilizing acts, 
including cocaine trafficking, ransoming hostages, and selling weapons. 
Chavez has openly lauded FARC in the National Assembly and is alleged 
to consider FARC and ELN allies against a feared U.S. invasion. It is tell-
ing that during the decade of his presidency, the rate of kidnappings in 
Venezuela has increased tenfold.27 Chavez's use of oil revenues to fund 
these groups destabilizes Columbia and Venezuela as well as the broader 
region.
Venezuela is not alone in its use of oil revenue to export instability. Money 
generated from oil and gas operations has funded radical jihadist move-
ments and has armed insurgencies throughout the world. For example, a 
2006 UN report noted that the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia received 
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shipments of arms and supplies from nationalized oil-producing states 
helping it to fight the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Iran, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen were among the countries noted, along 
with Hizbollah, who is supported by Iran.28 Iran's support for Hizbollah 
exemplifies another destabilizing use of oil revenue. Hizbollah is not the 
only terrorist group supported by Tehran, nor is Iran the only national-
ized oil producer that offers these groups assistance. Terrorist organiza-
tions that receive support from oil-producing countries include al-Qaida, 
Hizbollah, Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation for Palestine—General Command, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, FARC, ELN, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
The oil-producing states identified as providing support for these groups 
include Iran, Sudan, Syria,29 and as noted above, Venezuela.
Future Factors
This section will examine those factors related to oil nationalization that 
might be relevant in the future. These include the adequacy of the oil sup-
ply, the propensity of states to nationalize the resource, and the degree to 
which states transition from oil dependence.
Throughout the coming decade inadequate oil supply could lead to fre-
quent price spikes and negatively influence global economic development. 
Sustained high oil prices will limit global economic activity and the stabil-
ity of some states—particularly those that experience a decrease in GDP 
per inhabitant.30 Another possible consequence of a prolonged inade-
quate oil supply is the increased potential for conflict between states seek-
ing to safeguard their energy security. Some states might augment their 
ability to project military force in order to protect their oil supply corri-
dors. This could lead to arms races and increased tensions in some areas.
Conversely, if the oil supply proves adequate, the global economy in gen-
eral could continue to grow and provide opportunities for people in many 
parts of the world, thereby reducing their level of economic stress. Not 
only is the level of internal conflict likely to be reduced in a well-supplied 
world relative to a poorly-supplied one, but also the competition for oil 
between states can be expected to be reduced. This, in turn, should reduce 
the potential for inter-state conflicts attributable to oil.
Other influential factors will be the propensity of states to nationalize 
their oil industries and whether they will opt to treat their resource as a 
political tool or as a fungible resource. If oil supplies are inadequate over 
the course of this decade, it seems likely that the proclivity of states to 
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nationalize their oil industries will increase. Some states that do so might 
also be more tempted to wield the oil weapon. Even if oil companies are 
not nationalized, some exporting states may impose restrictions on the 
amount of oil that IOCs can export in order to safeguard the amount 
needed for domestic consumption. This would reduce the availability of 
oil on the market, drive up prices, and increase the potential harm posed 
by NOCs whose states make use of the oil weapon.
An additional factor that will influence energy security in the future is the 
degree to which states act to transition their economies away from oil 
dependency—especially for ground transportation. According to the IEA 
the percentage of oil consumed by the transportation sector globally has 
been steadily increasing from 45.5% in 1973 to 60.5% in 2006.31 While 
increasing the efficiency of existing oil-consuming technology might seem 
another option, it will not have a positive long-term effect, as a transition 
from oil would. The illusory benefit of efficiency on energy consumption 
was exposed by British economist William Stanley Jevons who, in the 
1860s, developed the theory now known as Jevons' Paradox, noting that 
when the use of a resource becomes more efficient, its cost decreases lead-
ing to increased consumption.32 Thus, improved energy efficiency is 
unlikely to reduce the dependence on oil and, therefore, is unlikely to 
reduce the negative security impacts of oil nationalization to a significant 
degree.
Critical Uncertainties
In order to construct the scenario quadrant, two critical uncertainties 
must be determined.33 These are chosen from the factors outlined in the 
preceding sections that are most influential to the focal issue: What 
impact might nationalization of oil reserves and industry assets have on 
global security in 2020? The factors examined above are summarized as 
follows:
•   Democratic state ownership of NOC
•   Non-democratic state ownership of NOC
•   Efficiency of NOC
•   Technical expertise of NOCs in light of more challenging extraction 
conditions
•   Control of reserves by NOCs
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•   Economic, political, and social stability in countries operating NOCs
•   Propensity of states to use oil exports as a political weapon
•   Use of oil revenues to fund arms races and export instability
•   Degree of market dominance by NOCs
•   Adequacy of oil supply
•   Ability of states to reduce the impact of oil supply interruptions
•   Rate of transition from the oil-based economy.
In reviewing these factors, it seems that the most influential are the pro-
pensity to use oil as a weapon and the rate of the transition from the oil-
based economy. While adequacy of oil supply might on first consideration 
seem more relevant, it is not the case. This is because inadequate supply 
will not necessarily lead to the use of the oil weapon, although it certainly 
could influence NOC states to resort to this tactic. Supply shortages could 
also lead to cooperation among affected states, thereby lessening the neg-
ative impact on energy security. For this reason, propensity to use oil 
exports as a political weapon is considered more influential on the focal 
issue than adequacy of supply.
The rate of transition from an oil-based economy is also extremely influ-
ential since reducing reliance on oil to fuel economic activity also reduces 
or eliminates the utility of the oil weapon. Moreover, when global oil con-
sumption is reduced, oil-exporting states will lose revenue, and those that 
finance destabilizing activities will have diminished resources to do so.
In ranking the influence of these factors, the relative market dominance of 
NOCs versus IOCs could be considered equally relevant to the propensity 
of states to use oil as a weapon. Indeed, the same logic argues for both fac-
tors; that is, if the market were to be dominated by IOCs, then the per-
centage of supply that could be used as a political weapon would be 
greatly reduced. Although, in light of the finite resource base, even if IOCs 
dominate the markets there will be supply shortages in the future due to 
dwindling reserves. Were the dominance factor used instead of the pro-
pensity factor, it is likely that the scenarios would be similar. However, 
another issue is that the oil market is currently dominated by NOCs, and 
for the purposes of this scenario set, it is assumed that this dominance 
will continue. In addition to the subjective consideration of the factors, I 
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devised a ranking matrix, Appendix B, and rank-scored the factors. This 
exercise yielded the same results as the more subjective analysis outlined 
in this section. The two critical uncertainties chosen are:
•   Propensity of states to use oil exports as a political weapon
•   Rate of transition from an oil-based economy
These critical uncertainties form the axes of the matrix and provide the 
underlying logic to the alternate futures scenarios.
Scenario Quadrant
The Scenarios
The Conflicted World scenario is characterized by a high propensity 
among NOC countries to use the oil weapon. It is also a world that has not 
witnessed significant efforts to transition to alternate forms of energy for 
most economic activity.
This future is the most challenging economically. Given the inadequacy of 
supply and the inability to generate GDP without it, oil prices will be very 
high in this scenario. Global annual economic growth rates will be low or 
negative since the cost of producing and transporting goods and services 
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will be very high. The pace of technological innovation in this scenario is 
slowest compared to the other possible worlds since resources are 
devoted to maintaining the status quo, particularly securing access to oil. 
Consequently, little is left over for investment in research and 
development.
The energy security situation of this quadrant is the most unstable since 
oil supply will endure periodic interruptions, yet states are least prepared 
to manage the consequences. Use of the oil weapon by states would not be 
the only interruption to supply unfortunately. It is likely that in this 
world, terrorist or insurgent groups might strike at the energy infrastruc-
ture more frequently than in other scenarios since the ability of states to 
withstand interruptions would be reduced; thus, the impact of successful 
attacks would be intensified. Moreover, these terrorists might receive 
more support in this scenario from NOC states since their oil revenues 
will be high given the supply scarcity.
The risk of inter-state conflict is high in this scenario since countries are 
hard-pressed to meet their energy needs. Moreover, tensions are higher 
since some of the nationalized states continue to use their substantial oil 
revenue to fund arms programs. These states, already frequently 
disrupting the oil supply, will likely resort to armed force to achieve their 
strategic aims. In this world, states dependent on oil imports will need 
extensive military power projection capacities to defend their access to 
oil. However, the ability of states to sustain these military capacities over 
time might decline, given the low or negative GDP growth in this scenario. 
This economic difficulty would force very hard choices for many 
governments.
The Crisis Management world, like the Conflicted World, is character-
ized by a high propensity among NOC countries to use the oil weapon. 
However, it is a world that is undergoing an energy transition to reduce 
the use of oil for transportation. Oil is used primarily in the petrochemical 
industry.
The economy in this scenario is slightly improved over Conflicted World, 
yet it is not without challenges. Since reliance on oil for transportation has 
been greatly reduced, the economy is less susceptible to the oil weapon. 
Economic growth will be modest in this potential future because there will 
be periodic use of the oil weapon. The petrochemical sector will face high 
oil costs that will reduce profitability and drive up prices for its products. 
To facilitate the transition from the oil-based economy, many states will 
be funding research and development; thus, the rate of technological 
advances will be robust.
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The energy security situation of this quadrant will also be slightly 
improved since oil forms a smaller portion of the energy supply picture. 
Still, oil supply will endure periodic interruptions, although most states 
will be better prepared to manage the consequences. Given the improved 
energy security situation, the proclivity of terrorists or insurgents to tar-
get oil infrastructure will be lower than in the Conflicted World.
The risk of inter-state conflict is moderate in this scenario. Some of the 
nationalized states continue to use their substantial oil revenue to fund 
arms programs and support terrorist and insurgent groups. These states 
remain willing to use the oil weapon, although the impact is muted 
because oil is less crucial for transportation. It may be possible that some 
of these states may perceive their declining power base and might engage 
in aggressive behavior while they still have the resources to do so. In this 
world, states dependent on oil imports might be more moderate in their 
military expenditures since their reliance on oil is not for transportation; 
rather, it is for petrochemicals. While this is a vital industry, oil-supply 
interruptions are of lesser consequence.
The Smooth Sailing scenario is most desirable from the perspective of 
energy security, economic activity, political development, and global sta-
bility. It is characterized by extensive efforts to transition away from oil-
based economic activity, particularly with regards to transportation. 
There is also a significant reduction in the use of the oil weapon by nation-
alized states, resulting in a generally more positive global security state.
The Smooth Sailing economy is defined by positive growth, primarily 
because the world has overcome its dependence on oil as the primary 
energy source for ground transportation and economic activity. Signifi-
cant amounts of money will be invested in research and development glo-
bally so innovation would be a characteristic of this future. It is possible 
that this future would be the most environmentally friendly, given the 
more pronounced transition from the oil age.
Likewise, energy security will be more stable in this future. To facilitate 
this transformation, alternative energy use will be extensive, thereby 
reducing the impact of oil supply disruptions. Some industries will remain 
dependent on oil, especially the petrochemical industry, but societies will 
endure oil supply shortages better since they are less dependent on oil for 
transportation.
The risk of inter-state war attributable to energy security will be very low 
in this future. Moreover, given the reduced oil-supply concerns, terrorist 
or insurgent groups will be less likely to attack the oil infrastructure, given 
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its reduced criticality. Intra-state war in states that rely heavily on oil rev-
enue may be more common in this scenario as GDP declines. These con-
flicts will be localized and are unlikely to have an impact beyond their 
immediate regions.
The Muddling Along world has a more stable security situation than 
Conflicted World and Crisis Management. This is primarily because 
states with nationalized oil industries do not use the oil weapon fre-
quently. While there will not be significant movement away from oil as 
the primary transportation energy source, it is possible that increased 
stockpiling might dissuade the nationalized states from disrupting supply 
for political objectives. As well, better relations between consumer and 
supplier states will also result in reduced use of the oil weapon. Regime 
change leading to more stability in key supplier states may also account 
for the reduced level of disruption.
The economic situation in Muddling Along is less robust that in Smooth 
Sailing primarily because the world is still dependent on oil for its eco-
nomic activity and supply will be constrained. So, oil prices will be 
extremely high, leading to a trickledown effect throughout the global 
economy. Consequently, productivity growth will be low in this scenario. 
Research and development funding will also be low in this scenario given 
the "business as usual" approach. Consequently, technological innovation 
will not be influential in this future.
The failure to significantly increase alternative energy use will leave coun-
tries vulnerable to oil supply disruptions and will negatively influence 
energy security. However, since the use of the oil weapon by supplier 
states will be infrequent, there will be fewer disruptions.
Given the reduced energy security in this scenario, tensions between 
states over energy issues will exist. However, in light of the more coopera-
tive arrangements between supplier and consumer states, energy-related 
inter-state conflicts are unlikely. Similarly, arms programs to safeguard 
the oil supply are unlikely to characterize this world. Since oil supply 
interruptions will be more detrimental to global economic prosperity, it is 
likely that terrorist and insurgent groups will target oil infrastructure fre-
quently. The risk of intra-state conflict is moderate in this scenario, due to 
the limited economic opportunities, leading some to conclude that they 
have nothing to lose by resorting to armed conflict to seek change.
Johnston: The Security Impact of Oil Nationalization: Alternate Futures Sce
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
16
Implications of the Four Scenarios
Based on these scenarios, it seems evident that a transition from an oil-
based economy will likely improve the future security situation. By reduc-
ing or ending the dependence on oil, the impact of the oil weapon will be 
diminished. This, in turn, will reduce tensions between states attributable 
to oil supply issues and potentially lower the risk of inter-state conflict 
attributable to this issue.
Another implication of these scenarios is that steps taken to moderate the 
behavior of those states that nationalize their oil industries will also 
improve security. Diplomatic, economic, political, and legal measures can 
help to maintain positive relations with nationalized states and demon-
strate to them that supply interruptions are not in their best interest. This 
may reduce the likelihood that they will make use of the oil weapon.
Indicators
Another valuable output from the scenario development process is the 
indicators that can be derived from the scenario stories. Determining the 
lead indicators from each story can enable warnings that might allow pol-
icymakers to better understand how the world is unfolding.34 This might 
facilitate timely decisions and enable contingency planning. Some indica-
tors, by no means an exhaustive list, from the scenarios in this set are as 
follows:
Conflicted World
•   Increased radicalization of governments in major oil-producing states
•   Increased incidents of unilateral contractual alterations or outright 
nationalization of assets on the part of these governments
•   Increased use of or threatened use of the oil weapon
•   Frequent supply interruptions
•   Frequent terrorist/insurgent attacks on oil infrastructure
•   Destabilizing arms programs undertaken by governments that have 
nationalized their oil industry
•   Oil import-dependent states develop extensive military projection 
capabilities to safeguard their oil transit corridors
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•   Inability to engage industry and governments in an energy transition to 
reduce oil dependence
•   Sustained high oil prices
•   Frequent use of strategic oil reserves to meet supply shortages
•   Inability to adequately stock strategic reserves
Crisis Management
•   Increased radicalization of governments in major oil-producing states
•   Increased incidents of unilateral contractual alterations or outright 
nationalization of assets on the part of these governments
•   Increased use of or threatened use of the oil weapon
•   Frequent supply interruptions
•   Frequent terrorist/insurgent attacks on oil infrastructure
•   Significant expenditures on arms programs on the part of some nation-
alized states, yet less on the part of developed states
•   High level of political violence and regime change in some nationalized 
states since their economic situation will be less robust than in some 
other scenarios
•   Robust development of technologies designed to transition from oil 
dependency
•   Moderate spending on R&D to support technological transitions
•   Moderate global economic growth
•   Maintenance of strategic oil reserves within developed states
Smooth Sailing
•   Dramatic de-carbonization of the global economy
•   More moderate political behavior on the part of nationalized states
•   More cooperative supply contracts and observance of the terms of 
joint-venture oil developments between IOCs and NOCs
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•   Few threats to interrupt oil supplies
•   Reduced arms spending globally
•   Fewer terrorists/insurgent attacks on oil infrastructure
•   Robust global economic growth
•   Few incidences of inter-state conflicts
•   Possible intra-state conflicts in oil export-dependent states
•   Substantial investment in research and development of new technology
•   Maintenance of strategic oil reserves, primarily for the petrochemical 
sector, within developed states
Muddling Along
•   More moderate political behavior on the part of nationalized states
•   More cooperative supply contracts and observance of the terms of 
joint-venture oil developments between IOCs and NOCs
•   Few threats to interrupt oil supplies
•   Reduced arms spending globally
•   Fewer terrorist/insurgent attacks on oil infrastructure
•   Slight global economic productivity growth—stunted due to oil 
dependence
•   Low level of research and development or technology
•   Strategic petroleum reserves are maintained, although with difficulty
Conclusion
Oil nationalization has a negative impact on energy security and also on 
global security in general. Energy security is reduced primarily because of 
the inefficiency that characterizes many NOCs as well as the redistribu-
tion of oil revenues away from reinvestment, ultimately reducing global 
supply. Global security can be reduced when some states use their oil 
exports as a political weapon to influence the behavior of consumer states 
or to punish them. Nationalization of oil can also have a negative impact 
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on security by providing resources to sustain destabilizing arms programs 
and to fund terrorist or insurgent groups. Domestically it can also feed 
corruption and contribute to inadequate economic development. These 
trends, in turn, can reduce opportunities for segments of the population 
and might engender internal armed conflict and civil war.
In a world lacking adequate oil supply, nationalization of oil assets will 
have the potential to reduce energy security, slow economic growth, and 
feed intra- and inter-state tensions—possibly to the point of armed con-
flict. Yet, there are options that might reduce the impact of, or avoid 
entirely, these negative outcomes. Key among these will be the degree to 
which industry and states can insulate their activities and societies from 
susceptibility to oil supply interruptions. There are a variety of steps that 
can be taken, such as diversifying supply options, increasing strategic 
reserves, and transitioning from a heavy dependence on oil for their 
transportation activities, particularly with regard to economic activities. 
Reducing the negative impact of supply interruption might reduce the 
perceived benefit that NOC states will gain by wielding the oil weapon. 
This may reduce the frequency of interruptions in the future.
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Appendix A: Nationalized Countries Oil Production35 
Country* 2008 % of 
Global 
Production
2008 
Proved 
Reserves 
(Bil 
Barrels)
2008 % of 
Global 
Proved 
Reserves
Reserves to 
Production 
Ratio 
(Years)
Algeria 2.2% 12.2 1.0% 16.7
Angola 2.3% 13.5 1.1% 19.7
Azerbaijan 1.1% 7.0 0.6% 20.9
Brazil 2.4% 12.6 1.0% 18.2
Brunei 0.2% 1.1 0.1% 16.9
China 4.8% 15.5 1.2% 11.1
Columbia 0.8% 1.4 0.1% 6.0
Ecuador 0.7% 3.8 0.3% 20.3
Egypt 0.9% 4.3 0.3% 16.4
Equatorial 
Guinea
0.5% 1.7 0.1% 12.9
Gabon† 0.3% 3.2 0.3% 37.0
India 0.9% 5.8 0.5% 20.7
Indonesia 1.2% 3.7 0.3% 10.2
Iran 5.3% 137.6 10.9% 86.9
Iraq 3.0% 115.0 9.1% >100
Kazakhstan 1.8% 39.8 3.2% 70.0
Kuwait 3.5% 101.5 8.1% 99.6
Libya 2.2% 43.7 3.5% 64.6
Malaysia 0.9% 5.5 0.4% 19.8
Mexico 4.0% 11.9 0.9% 10.3
Nigeria 2.7% 36.2 2.9% 45.6
Norway 2.9% 7.5 0.6% 8.3
Oman 0.9% 5.6 0.4% 20.9
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Qatar 1.5% 27.3 2.2% 54.1
Russian 
Federation
12.4% 79.0 6.3% 21.8
Saudi Arabia 13.1% 264.1 21% 66.5
Tunisia 0.1% 6.7 0.5% 38.1
Uzbekistan 0.1% 3.4 0.3% 6.0
UAE 3.6% 97.8 7.8% 89.7
Vietnam 0.4% 4.7 0.4% 40.8
Venezuela 3.4% 99.4 7.9% >100
Yemen 0.4% 2.7 0.2% 23.9
Total 80.5% 1175.2 92.5%
World 1258.0‡
* This list contains those countries identified in the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (June 2009) that have nationalized oil and or gas industries. There may be 
other countries that have nationalized oil and/or gas industries, although their assets 
are insufficient to merit their listing in the Review.
† Gabon recently announced that it would create a national oil company by end 2010. 
See "Gabon to Launch National Oil Company," Reuters, April 23, 2010, available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63L2ID20100422.
‡ Note that the total reserves listed in the BP Statistical Review do not include oil 
sands reserves. When these are added in, the global total increases to 1408.7 billion 
barrels. Likewise, the percentages of reserves on this chart are calculated based on 
the reserves excluding oil sands.
Country* 2008 % of 
Global 
Production
2008 
Proved 
Reserves 
(Bil 
Barrels)
2008 % of 
Global 
Proved 
Reserves
Reserves to 
Production 
Ratio 
(Years)
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Appendix B: Factors Scoring Table
Factors Impact 
on oil 
supply
Eco-
nomic 
Impact
Domes-
tic Politi-
cal 
Impact 
for NOC 
State
Poten-
tial for 
Armed 
Conflict
Total
Factors Affected by 
NOC States
1–5; 1 is 
positive* 
and 5 is 
negative
1–5; 1 is 
positive 
and 5 is 
negative
1–5; 1 is 
positive 
and 5 is 
negative
1–5; 1 is 
low and 5 
is high
Democratic state 
ownership of NOC
1 2 1 1 5
Non-democratic 
state ownership of 
NOC
4 4 4 3 15
Inefficient NOC 4 4 4 1 13
Efficient NOC 1 1 1 1
Technical expertise 
of NOC and 
challenging 
extraction 
conditions
4 4 4 2 14
Control of reserves 
by NOCs
4 4 2 3 13
Economic, political, 
and social stability 
in NOC state
3 4 4 3 14
Propensity of states 
to use oil weapon
5 5 4 3 17
Use of oil revenues 
to fund arms races 
and export 
instability
3 4 4 4 15
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Degree of market 
dominance by 
NOCs
4 3 3 3 13
Adequate oil supply 1 1 2 1 5
Inadequate oil 
supply
5 5 3 3 16
Mitigation Factors 1–5; 1 is 
negative 
and 5 is 
positive
1–5; 1 is 
negative 
and 5 is 
positive
1–5; 1 is 
negative 
and 5 is 
positive
1–5; 1 is 
high and 5 
is low
Ability of states to 
reduce impact of 
disruptions
3 4 4 4 15
Rate of transition 
from the oil-based 
economy (scores 
are based on a fast 
transition)
5 5 3 4 17
* The words "positive" and "negative" are used from the perspective of the consumer of 
oil and also from the perspective of impact on global energy security, not from the 
perspective of the NOC state. From the perspective of an NOC state, for example, the 
use of the oil weapon can be a positive thing, whereas for the countries affected and 
the global energy market, it is not.
Factors Impact 
on oil 
supply
Eco-
nomic 
Impact
Domes-
tic Politi-
cal 
Impact 
for NOC 
State
Poten-
tial for 
Armed 
Conflict
Total
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